By sector
A payments firm and a trade finance desk are not exposed to the same typologies, and they do not have the same control gap. The register of 81 is shared; each sector below shows only the entries that apply to it, the control weakness the assessment probes, and the supervisory context behind it.
A commercial bank sees the widest range of laundering methods, and carries the alert queue most of them eventually reach.
Banks increasingly treat payment firms, EMIs and their agent networks as a source of downstream financial-crime exposure.
Trade laundering is documentary. The paperwork is produced to be plausible, and is usually checked file by file rather than read as a set.
Private wealth laundering sits inside apparently legitimate ownership, lending and estate structures, which are rarely retested once a relationship is established.
Laundering in capital markets looks exactly like trading, because it is trading.
The ledger is permanent, so the exposure sits at the edges: on-ramp, off-ramp and identity.
Law firms complete the step that gives a structure legal effect, and the client account is the part other institutions trust without looking behind it.
Accountants produce the record other institutions rely on, including the accounts that make an implausible business look filed and settled.
Property and high-value goods hold value, change hands easily, and in the case of art and antiquities carry no ownership registry at all.
Insurance proceeds receive less downstream scrutiny because they arrive from a regulated insurer, which makes the payout itself a laundering mechanism.
Operators have to distinguish a customer losing money badly from one losing it deliberately, on the same account activity.