The control gap we probe
Merchant onboarding is optimised for conversion, and the review that would catch an implausible estate happens after volume has already run through it. Distributor and agent oversight is where the gap usually sits.
Sector assessment
41 laundering methods apply to this sector. 24 are rarely covered in standard AML training. The sector assessment uses 18 cases.
Banks increasingly treat payment firms, EMIs and their agent networks as a source of downstream financial-crime exposure.
Merchant onboarding is optimised for conversion, and the review that would catch an implausible estate happens after volume has already run through it. Distributor and agent oversight is where the gap usually sits.
The FCA has written repeatedly to payments and e-money firms on financial crime controls and safeguarding, and has been explicit that growth is not a defence for control immaturity. The collapse of a major processor over acquiring balances that could not be located set the reference point for the whole sector.
Authorised payment institutions, small payment institutions, e-money institutions and acquirers are all relevant persons. Registered agents and distributors are the position most often got wrong: acting under a principal's permission does not move the obligation onto the principal, and the principal is answerable for the estate either way.
Not one case. Every case that exercises a typology on your list is part of your mark, weighted by how much of your exposure it carries. The weights are derived from the register rather than chosen, so adding a case re-derives them instead of leaving the old ones wrong.
| Case | Your typologies | Share of your mark |
|---|---|---|
| The Merchant Bookwritten for your desk | 5 | 9% |
| The Verification Desk | 9 | 17% |
| The Betting Account | 7 | 13% |
| The Collection Network | 4 | 7% |
| The Alert Queue | 3 | 5% |
| The Client Engagement | 3 | 5% |
| The Exchange Desk | 3 | 5% |
| The Funnel Account | 3 | 5% |
| The Incoming Payment | 3 | 5% |
| The Victim Ledger | 3 | 5% |
| The Fundraising Appeal | 2 | 4% |
| The Goods Chain | 2 | 4% |
| The Payment Trail | 2 | 4% |
| The Policy Book | 2 | 4% |
| The Client Account | 1 | 2% |
| The Disclosure | 1 | 2% |
| The Securities Book | 1 | 2% |
| The Trade Corridor | 1 | 2% |
£99one payment, 12 months, nothing renews
£750pilot, up to 25 people, invoiced
Drawn from the full register and filtered to this sector. Each entry states what the typology looks like inside your own systems, and names the source it came from. 41 of the 41 are currently exercised by an assessment case; the rest are documented here and not yet built into one.
Fraud proceeds gathered from many unconnected remitters into a cash-plausible front, then consolidated outward in amounts set below the reporting threshold.
High inbound velocity from unrelated personal accounts, same-day outbound to newly added payees, values clustered just under the threshold.
A genuine customer instructs a legitimate overseas remittance. A complicit remitter passes the beneficiary details to a criminal network, which pays criminal cash into the innocent beneficiary's account instead, and keeps the customer's clean funds abroad.
Third-party cash deposits into an ordinary customer's account, in values below the reporting threshold, made by people with no relationship to the accountholder, matching an expected inbound remittance that never arrives.
A real trading business is used as cover, but the laundered volume bears no relationship to what the business physically does.
Merchant acquiring data, utilisation meters, headcount or occupancy flat while account credits multiply. The business has not grown; only the account has.
Accounts are opened or handed over by recruited individuals, increasingly sourced through social media and messaging platforms, and used for a short burst of receipt-and-forward activity before abandonment.
Newly opened accounts with immediate inbound-outbound throughput and no other life, device and IP reuse across unconnected customers, and a demographic skew toward students and young adults.
Value moves between brokers by settlement and offset, with no cross-border transaction for a bank to observe.
Settlement legs only: periodic net transfers between broker accounts, trade invoices used to square positions, and cash aggregation ahead of settlement.
Small test transactions are run to establish where a firm's rules and thresholds sit, and activity is then shaped to stay just inside them. Automation makes the probing cheap and the adaptation continuous.
Sequences of small value-varying transactions preceding a step change in volume, activity that settles just below alerting thresholds across several distinct rules at once, and customers whose behaviour changes within days of a rule being retuned.
Victims are exploited through labour or sexual services, and the proceeds are placed through cash-intensive front businesses or through the victims' own accounts, which the controller operates.
Funnel accounts taking cash deposits below the reporting threshold in one location and withdrawn immediately in another; multiple unrelated accountholders sharing an address, device or telephone number; wage payments returned to the employer shortly after credit; customers who never attend alone and whose account is operated by a third party.
Access to abuse material or live-streamed abuse is bought through small, repeated payments, frequently to high-risk jurisdictions and increasingly through virtual assets and prepaid instruments.
Small repeated payments, often at unusual hours, to money transfer beneficiaries in a small number of jurisdictions with no family or trade connection to the customer; use of prepaid instruments or virtual assets by a customer with no other digital activity; and payment values clustered in narrow bands.
Fees are collected in the country of origin, frequently held by an intermediary until arrival, and settled through informal value transfer rather than any traceable cross-border payment.
Money service business accounts with corridor concentration inconsistent with any diaspora trade, third-party cash payments made on behalf of individuals with no relationship to the payer, and settlement transfers between broker accounts along known routes.
Physical currency is consolidated and moved across borders by courier, vehicle or freight, avoiding the banking system entirely until it reaches a jurisdiction where placement is easier.
The banking exposure sits either side of the movement: aggregation of cash before departure through connected accounts and businesses, and placement afterwards in the destination jurisdiction with no corresponding trade.
Funds are staked and withdrawn with minimal play, or bet across correlated outcomes so that losses are accepted as the cost of converting cash into documented winnings.
Operator settlements to customers whose deposits and withdrawals net close to zero over time, betting patterns designed to minimise variance rather than to win, and third-party funding of accounts.
A company is dissolved or struck off the register yet continues to bank, invoice and transact, because registry status is checked at onboarding and never again.
An established account whose entity no longer exists at the registry. Detectable only by re-verifying incorporation status across the existing book, which is a batch job most firms have never run.
Statements, identity documents and supporting evidence are generated rather than obtained, and are internally consistent in ways genuine documents are not.
Statements with no fees or charges across months, running balances consistent to the penny, logos at incorrect aspect ratio, institution codes in the wrong format, identity photographs internally inconsistent or inconsistent with stated age, third-party webcam plugins during liveness checks.
Rather than holding a fake face up to the camera, the attacker bypasses the camera entirely: virtual-camera software injects a pre-rendered or real-time face-swapped video stream directly into the onboarding app, so the liveness check is validating a video file rather than a person.
Emulator and virtual-camera artefacts in the capture stream, device and app-integrity signals that contradict a genuine handset, repeated onboarding attempts from the same device fingerprint under different identities, and capture metadata inconsistent with the phone the customer claims to hold.
A person who does not exist is assembled from a mixture of real and fabricated data, passed through onboarding, allowed to build a credit and transaction history, and then used as durable laundering infrastructure rather than for a single fraud.
Thin-file customers who behave impeccably for months, clusters sharing partial attributes such as address, device or contact details, credit files that begin abruptly in adulthood, and accounts whose only real purpose emerges long after onboarding.
An entity that does not trade is given everything a due diligence check looks for: a website, product imagery, a founder with a biography and video presence, filed documentation and a digital footprint, all generated rather than earned.
A corporate customer or merchant whose entire evidenced existence post-dates its application, imagery and copy that cannot be traced to any real premises or product, a domain registered shortly before onboarding, and referees who exist only online.
Cloned voice defeats the control the firm added to catch impersonation: the callback. Voice biometrics and telephone banking authentication are attacked with audio generated from publicly available recordings.
Voice authentication passing on a call whose channel or device signals are inconsistent with the customer, callbacks answered on newly registered numbers, and instructions confirmed by voice that the customer later disputes entirely.
Synthetic video and voice impersonate executives on a live call to authorise urgent transfers, defeating the callback and video-verification controls firms adopted precisely to stop email-based impersonation.
Multiple urgent same-day transfers to new beneficiaries authorised by one employee, outside normal approval patterns, following a confidential instruction the payer cannot corroborate internally.
Funds are pushed into a recently authorised payment or e-money institution, which aggregates client money and breaks the visible chain of attribution.
Payments to an EMI incorporated months earlier with no filed accounts, no plausible commercial relationship to the payer, and volumes out of line with its stated business.
A payment firm issues virtual IBANs that resolve to a pooled account, so the IBAN's country code and apparent identity do not correspond to the underlying accountholder, jurisdiction or supervising authority.
Counterparty IBANs whose country differs from the customer's stated location, payments that appear domestic but settle cross-border, and beneficiary names that cannot be reconciled to the underlying account.
A payment processor becomes the laundering channel, onboarding merchants that do not exist or sit in high-risk categories, generating settlement flows that read as ordinary card revenue.
Processing volumes implausible against the merchant estate, concentration in gambling, foreign exchange and pharmaceutical categories, and offshore IBCs onboarded as merchants.
A regulated firm's obligations are discharged through a long tail of agents and distributors, and the criminal relationship sits at an agent the principal has never meaningfully supervised.
Concentration of unusual activity at particular agents, agents whose volumes are disproportionate to their location, and onboarding files completed to a materially lower standard than the principal's own.
Proceeds are recycled as royalty income by paying for streams of content the launderer controls, or by licensing intellectual property between related parties.
Royalty or licensing receipts from a platform with no corresponding audience, and licence fees between connected entities with no arm's-length benchmark.
Value is loaded onto prepaid or gift instruments, moved physically or as codes, and redeemed or resold, breaking the account-to-account chain entirely.
Bulk purchases of stored-value products at retail, card-load patterns inconsistent with any consumer use, and programme manager settlement accounts with volumes exceeding the plausible cardholder base.
A respondent bank provides correspondent services to further institutions, so the correspondent's real exposure is to a chain of downstream banks it has never assessed and whose customers it cannot see.
Payment volumes and corridors inconsistent with the respondent's own customer base, beneficiary and originator fields naming institutions that are not the respondent, and activity in currencies or jurisdictions outside the stated relationship.
A storefront lists high-value, low-bulk goods and sells to buyers the operator controls, so the platform's own payment rails convert criminal funds into documented sales revenue.
Platform settlements to a merchant whose sales concentrate among a small set of repeat buyers, pricing that discourages genuine customers, and shipping weights and destinations inconsistent with the goods described.
An autonomous agent executes the layering stage without a human in the loop: fragmenting funds into micro-transactions, selecting bridge and exchange routes on live liquidity, sizing transfers to stay inside observed thresholds, and adapting when a route stops working.
Transaction sequences with machine timing and sizing characteristics, activity that reshapes itself shortly after a control is changed, and volumes of small movements that exceed what any manual operation could sustain.
Assets are swapped rapidly across blockchains and between tokens using bridges and decentralised exchanges, so that following the trail requires a new tool, a new dataset and a new analyst judgment at every hop.
For a VASP: deposits whose immediate provenance is a bridge or DEX contract rather than an identifiable counterparty, and short holding times between receipt and onward swap. For a bank: fiat settlement from an exchange whose own inbound provenance cannot be evidenced.
Dollar-denominated stablecoins, predominantly on low-fee chains, have become the settlement layer between criminal enterprises, replacing correspondent banking for cross-border criminal value transfer.
Fiat on-ramp and off-ramp volumes at exchanges and OTC desks, and customers whose banked income disappears while spending continues. The settlement itself never touches the banking system.
Escrow-style online marketplaces broker laundering, stolen data, scam infrastructure and trafficking services between criminal counterparties, holding funds until both sides perform.
Exposure is indirect and sits at the fiat edges: payment institutions, exchanges and correspondent relationships with entities in the group's network. The prohibition itself is the compliance obligation.
Long-form investment and relationship frauds, frequently run from trafficked-labour compounds, collect victim funds through mule accounts and convert them into stablecoins for onward settlement.
Victim-side outbound payments escalating over weeks to newly added payees and exchange accounts, followed by indemnity claims and recall requests once the victim realises. The collection accounts show inbound from many unconnected individuals.
An unregistered or high-risk service obtains market access through an account at a compliant exchange, so the compliant firm's customer is in reality a downstream book of unknown customers.
A single institutional customer whose deposit and withdrawal counterparties number in the thousands, activity patterns inconsistent with a single beneficial owner, and onward flows to jurisdictions the customer does not operate in.
A digital asset with no objective value is traded between wallets under common control at escalating prices, manufacturing a sale record that converts funds into apparent trading profit.
Marketplace settlement receipts where buyer and seller are ultimately the same interest, and gaming or marketplace platform accounts with volumes unrelated to any player base.
Professional laundering networks settle obligations by offsetting: cash is delivered to a criminal group in one country while an equivalent sum is credited in another, with no cross-border transfer. Purchasing agents buy luxury goods on cards and settle the balances with criminal cash.
Card accounts repaid in cash or by unrelated third parties, purchase volumes far exceeding personal use, and paired domestic flows in two jurisdictions with no instrument connecting them.
Counterfeit product is sold through online marketplaces and social channels, with proceeds settled through payment service providers and consolidated by aggregators before repatriation.
Merchant accounts with high chargeback and dispute rates against a narrow product range, settlement to beneficiaries unrelated to the listed merchant, and rapid rotation of storefronts under the same banking relationship.
Capability is rented rather than built. Subscription platforms supply mule account provisioning, KYC-bypass tooling, synthetic identity generation, deepfake kits and end-to-end laundering, so an operator needs money rather than skill.
The same tooling signature across customers with no other connection: identical document templates, shared device or capture characteristics, and mule accounts appearing in coordinated batches rather than individually.
A campaign is funded by pre-arranged participants, run over several weeks and wound up, with the venture's failure removing any party with an interest in scrutinising it.
Platform settlements to a venture with no product history, funding concentrated among connected contributors, and a rapid orderly wind-up.
Funding is raised in small amounts through appeals, crowdfunding and sham charitable structures, and moved in values individually too low to trigger monitoring. The concern is destination and intent rather than the size or origin of the funds.
Small recurring outbound payments to campaigns, appeals or virtual asset addresses associated with proscribed causes; a charity whose disbursement pattern does not match its stated programme; and clusters of small transfers converging on a single beneficiary.
A charitable structure is created or captured to provide a legitimate-looking channel for funds, exploiting the sector's donation-based inflows and disbursement to high-risk jurisdictions.
Donation inflows inconsistent with any visible fundraising activity, grant disbursements to unverifiable overseas partners, trustee turnover with no succession, and cash withdrawals in conflict-adjacent jurisdictions.
A workforce is fragmented across hundreds or thousands of small companies so each can claim employment allowances and VAT thresholds it is not entitled to, with companies replaced on a rolling basis before scrutiny arrives.
Large numbers of newly incorporated companies sharing directors, addresses or formation agents, each running modest payroll, appearing and dissolving on a cycle.
Operatives obtain remote technical roles using stolen or fabricated identities, often through intermediaries, and route salary payments onward to sanctioned regimes.
Payroll and contractor payments to accounts whose device and location signals contradict the stated worker location, several apparently unrelated contractors sharing payment infrastructure, and rapid onward transfer of net pay.
The Merchant Book carries 5 of the 41 typologies above and 9 per cent of your mark. Full debrief, no account, no card.
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One documented case each week. One decision. The answer and the source afterwards.