All sectors

Sector assessment

Retail and Commercial Banking

68 laundering methods apply to this sector. 33 are rarely covered in standard AML training. The sector assessment uses 23 cases.

A commercial bank sees the widest range of laundering methods, and carries the alert queue most of them eventually reach.

Start The Alert Queue — 8 minNo account required · Full debrief at the end
Typologies for you
68
Assessed
68
Rarely trained
33
Aimed at
MLRO, Head of Financial Crime, Head of Transaction Monitoring

The control gap we probe

Registry status and mandate data are verified at onboarding and rarely re-checked afterwards. A company struck off three years ago, or a signatory who died abroad, will not trigger anything on its own; the account simply keeps working.

Supervisory context

The FCA has demonstrated it will pursue criminal proceedings for monitoring failures, not only civil penalties. Where a firm's own system misclassified deposits and its staff escalated concerns that went nowhere, the failure was in judgment and follow-through rather than in the absence of a rule.

Who this is for

Every deposit-taker and commercial lender authorised in the UK is a relevant person under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. There is no partial position here: if you hold client deposits or process payments, the whole of this applies to you.

The Banking Assessment

Not one case. Every case that exercises a typology on your list is part of your mark, weighted by how much of your exposure it carries. The weights are derived from the register rather than chosen, so adding a case re-derives them instead of leaving the old ones wrong.

Cases in your assessment
23
Time to sit all of them
179 min
Typologies covered
68
Left uncovered
0
CaseYour typologiesShare of your mark
The Alert Queuewritten for your desk33%
The Verification Desk913%
The Client Engagement88%
The Client Account77%
The Goods Chain77%
The Policy Book77%
The Relationship Review77%
The Betting Account66%
The Collection Network44%
The Funnel Account44%
The Incoming Payment44%
The Trade Corridor44%
The Victim Ledger44%
The Exchange Desk33%
The Merchant Book33%
The Securities Book33%
The Fundraising Appeal22%
The Disclosure22%
The Onboarding Interview22%
The Payment Trail22%
The Private Client File22%
The Sponsorship File22%
The Invoice Pack11%

What you get for the price

£99one payment, 12 months, nothing renews

  • All 23 cases in your sector assessment, about 179 minutes, plus every other case on the site
  • Your mark for the Banking Assessment, and a full debrief on every case naming each finding and its source
  • A certificate recording exact CPD hours, publicly verifiable
  • Re-sit any case as often as you like for 12 months

£750pilot, up to 25 people, invoiced

  • Your whole team sits the Banking Assessment, not a single case
  • A gap report naming which of your 68 typologies the team detected and which they missed, with detection rates
  • Every participant gets their own full debrief
  • Deducted from a licence if you take one within 90 days
See an example gap report for Banking

No VAT is charged. Team licences and seat counts.

The 68 typologies that apply to this sector

Drawn from the full register and filtered to this sector. Each entry states what the typology looks like inside your own systems, and names the source it came from. 68 of the 68 are currently exercised by an assessment case; the rest are documented here and not yet built into one.

Placement and collection13

Mule Collection and Threshold Consolidation

In the assessment

Fraud proceeds gathered from many unconnected remitters into a cash-plausible front, then consolidated outward in amounts set below the reporting threshold.

What the analyst sees

High inbound velocity from unrelated personal accounts, same-day outbound to newly added payees, values clustered just under the threshold.

Cuckoo SmurfingRarely covered in training

In the assessment

A genuine customer instructs a legitimate overseas remittance. A complicit remitter passes the beneficiary details to a criminal network, which pays criminal cash into the innocent beneficiary's account instead, and keeps the customer's clean funds abroad.

What the analyst sees

Third-party cash deposits into an ordinary customer's account, in values below the reporting threshold, made by people with no relationship to the accountholder, matching an expected inbound remittance that never arrives.

Cash-Intensive Front Business

In the assessment

A genuine cash trading business banks criminal cash alongside its own takings, using the trade's plausible cash profile as cover.

What the analyst sees

Deposit volumes far exceeding what the trade supports, physical tells at the counter, and transaction monitoring that misclassifies the deposit type.

Turnover Inconsistency Against a Physical Measure

In the assessment

A real trading business is used as cover, but the laundered volume bears no relationship to what the business physically does.

What the analyst sees

Merchant acquiring data, utilisation meters, headcount or occupancy flat while account credits multiply. The business has not grown; only the account has.

Doppelganger Accounts Across InstitutionsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

One genuine cash business banks its real takings at Bank A, then opens cloned accounts for the same business at Banks B through E and pays in identical deposits at each.

What the analyst sees

Nothing, at a single institution. Each account shows a plausible business banking its daily receipts. The pattern exists only across banks, so it surfaces through consortium data sharing or a merger of two of the institutions involved.

Money Mule Networks and Recruitment

In the assessment

Accounts are opened or handed over by recruited individuals, increasingly sourced through social media and messaging platforms, and used for a short burst of receipt-and-forward activity before abandonment.

What the analyst sees

Newly opened accounts with immediate inbound-outbound throughput and no other life, device and IP reuse across unconnected customers, and a demographic skew toward students and young adults.

Hawala and Informal Value Transfer

In the assessment

Value moves between brokers by settlement and offset, with no cross-border transaction for a bank to observe.

What the analyst sees

Settlement legs only: periodic net transfers between broker accounts, trade invoices used to square positions, and cash aggregation ahead of settlement.

Control Probing and Detection-Threshold Discovery

In the assessment

Small test transactions are run to establish where a firm's rules and thresholds sit, and activity is then shaped to stay just inside them. Automation makes the probing cheap and the adaptation continuous.

What the analyst sees

Sequences of small value-varying transactions preceding a step change in volume, activity that settles just below alerting thresholds across several distinct rules at once, and customers whose behaviour changes within days of a rule being retuned.

Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery ProceedsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Victims are exploited through labour or sexual services, and the proceeds are placed through cash-intensive front businesses or through the victims' own accounts, which the controller operates.

What the analyst sees

Funnel accounts taking cash deposits below the reporting threshold in one location and withdrawn immediately in another; multiple unrelated accountholders sharing an address, device or telephone number; wage payments returned to the employer shortly after credit; customers who never attend alone and whose account is operated by a third party.

Child Sexual Exploitation Payment PatternsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Access to abuse material or live-streamed abuse is bought through small, repeated payments, frequently to high-risk jurisdictions and increasingly through virtual assets and prepaid instruments.

What the analyst sees

Small repeated payments, often at unusual hours, to money transfer beneficiaries in a small number of jurisdictions with no family or trade connection to the customer; use of prepaid instruments or virtual assets by a customer with no other digital activity; and payment values clustered in narrow bands.

Migrant Smuggling Settlement

In the assessment

Fees are collected in the country of origin, frequently held by an intermediary until arrival, and settled through informal value transfer rather than any traceable cross-border payment.

What the analyst sees

Money service business accounts with corridor concentration inconsistent with any diaspora trade, third-party cash payments made on behalf of individuals with no relationship to the payer, and settlement transfers between broker accounts along known routes.

Bulk Cash Smuggling and Cash Couriers

In the assessment

Physical currency is consolidated and moved across borders by courier, vehicle or freight, avoiding the banking system entirely until it reaches a jurisdiction where placement is easier.

What the analyst sees

The banking exposure sits either side of the movement: aggregation of cash before departure through connected accounts and businesses, and placement afterwards in the destination jurisdiction with no corresponding trade.

Gambling and Betting Channel Misuse

In the assessment

Funds are staked and withdrawn with minimal play, or bet across correlated outcomes so that losses are accepted as the cost of converting cash into documented winnings.

What the analyst sees

Operator settlements to customers whose deposits and withdrawals net close to zero over time, betting patterns designed to minimise variance rather than to win, and third-party funding of accounts.

Corporate and identity11

Necrofinance: dead directors and zombie accountsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Deceased individuals are recorded as directors, officers and shareholders, and accounts opened by the living are run on after death. There is no accomplice who can be pressured, because the nominal principal is dead.

What the analyst sees

An account in good standing whose signatory died in a jurisdiction the firm does not search, filings continuing for a director with no verifiable life, and mandates never refreshed because the account never triggered a review.

Ghost Companies: struck off but still transactingRarely covered in training

In the assessment

A company is dissolved or struck off the register yet continues to bank, invoice and transact, because registry status is checked at onboarding and never again.

What the analyst sees

An established account whose entity no longer exists at the registry. Detectable only by re-verifying incorporation status across the existing book, which is a batch job most firms have never run.

Beneficial Ownership Obfuscation

In the assessment

Layered holding structures across free-zone and offshore jurisdictions terminate in a corporate nominee, so the declared beneficial owner is asserted rather than evidenced.

What the analyst sees

A structure chart that never evidences control, a nominee shareholder defeating verification, and a customer who offers further documents instead of an answer.

Synthetic and AI-Generated Onboarding DocumentsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Statements, identity documents and supporting evidence are generated rather than obtained, and are internally consistent in ways genuine documents are not.

What the analyst sees

Statements with no fees or charges across months, running balances consistent to the penny, logos at incorrect aspect ratio, institution codes in the wrong format, identity photographs internally inconsistent or inconsistent with stated age, third-party webcam plugins during liveness checks.

Biometric Injection and Liveness BypassRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Rather than holding a fake face up to the camera, the attacker bypasses the camera entirely: virtual-camera software injects a pre-rendered or real-time face-swapped video stream directly into the onboarding app, so the liveness check is validating a video file rather than a person.

What the analyst sees

Emulator and virtual-camera artefacts in the capture stream, device and app-integrity signals that contradict a genuine handset, repeated onboarding attempts from the same device fingerprint under different identities, and capture metadata inconsistent with the phone the customer claims to hold.

Synthetic Identities at ScaleRarely covered in training

In the assessment

A person who does not exist is assembled from a mixture of real and fabricated data, passed through onboarding, allowed to build a credit and transaction history, and then used as durable laundering infrastructure rather than for a single fraud.

What the analyst sees

Thin-file customers who behave impeccably for months, clusters sharing partial attributes such as address, device or contact details, credit files that begin abruptly in adulthood, and accounts whose only real purpose emerges long after onboarding.

AI-Fabricated Corporate PresenceRarely covered in training

In the assessment

An entity that does not trade is given everything a due diligence check looks for: a website, product imagery, a founder with a biography and video presence, filed documentation and a digital footprint, all generated rather than earned.

What the analyst sees

A corporate customer or merchant whose entire evidenced existence post-dates its application, imagery and copy that cannot be traced to any real premises or product, a domain registered shortly before onboarding, and referees who exist only online.

Synthetic Voice Against Telephone and Callback ControlsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Cloned voice defeats the control the firm added to catch impersonation: the callback. Voice biometrics and telephone banking authentication are attacked with audio generated from publicly available recordings.

What the analyst sees

Voice authentication passing on a call whose channel or device signals are inconsistent with the customer, callbacks answered on newly registered numbers, and instructions confirmed by voice that the customer later disputes entirely.

Deepfake-Enabled Payment Instruction FraudRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Synthetic video and voice impersonate executives on a live call to authorise urgent transfers, defeating the callback and video-verification controls firms adopted precisely to stop email-based impersonation.

What the analyst sees

Multiple urgent same-day transfers to new beneficiaries authorised by one employee, outside normal approval patterns, following a confidential instruction the payer cannot corroborate internally.

State-Owned Entity Exemption AbuseRarely covered in training

In the assessment

An entity claims government ownership to attract the lighter due diligence applied to state bodies, sometimes trading on a name close to a genuine state-linked company.

What the analyst sees

Due diligence closed out on an assertion of state ownership, and transaction volumes exceeding the plausible revenue of the entity the name resembles.

Investment Migration and Residence Schemes

In the assessment

Residence or citizenship is obtained through qualifying investment, converting funds of uncertain origin into a residency status that subsequently anchors banking relationships and asset holdings.

What the analyst sees

Source of wealth evidenced principally by the qualifying investment itself, onboarding shortly after grant of status, and jurisdiction of residence inconsistent with any economic or family connection.

Payments infrastructure6

Nested Payment Institutions

In the assessment

Funds are pushed into a recently authorised payment or e-money institution, which aggregates client money and breaks the visible chain of attribution.

What the analyst sees

Payments to an EMI incorporated months earlier with no filed accounts, no plausible commercial relationship to the payer, and volumes out of line with its stated business.

Virtual IBAN MisuseRarely covered in training

In the assessment

A payment firm issues virtual IBANs that resolve to a pooled account, so the IBAN's country code and apparent identity do not correspond to the underlying accountholder, jurisdiction or supervising authority.

What the analyst sees

Counterparty IBANs whose country differs from the customer's stated location, payments that appear domestic but settle cross-border, and beneficiary names that cannot be reconciled to the underlying account.

Streaming, Licensing and Royalty FlowsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Proceeds are recycled as royalty income by paying for streams of content the launderer controls, or by licensing intellectual property between related parties.

What the analyst sees

Royalty or licensing receipts from a platform with no corresponding audience, and licence fees between connected entities with no arm's-length benchmark.

Prepaid Cards, Gift Cards and Stored Value

In the assessment

Value is loaded onto prepaid or gift instruments, moved physically or as codes, and redeemed or resold, breaking the account-to-account chain entirely.

What the analyst sees

Bulk purchases of stored-value products at retail, card-load patterns inconsistent with any consumer use, and programme manager settlement accounts with volumes exceeding the plausible cardholder base.

Correspondent Banking and Nested Downstream AccessRarely covered in training

In the assessment

A respondent bank provides correspondent services to further institutions, so the correspondent's real exposure is to a chain of downstream banks it has never assessed and whose customers it cannot see.

What the analyst sees

Payment volumes and corridors inconsistent with the respondent's own customer base, beneficiary and originator fields naming institutions that are not the respondent, and activity in currencies or jurisdictions outside the stated relationship.

Online Marketplaces and Controlled Resale

In the assessment

A storefront lists high-value, low-bulk goods and sells to buyers the operator controls, so the platform's own payment rails convert criminal funds into documented sales revenue.

What the analyst sees

Platform settlements to a merchant whose sales concentrate among a small set of repeat buyers, pricing that discourages genuine customers, and shipping weights and destinations inconsistent with the goods described.

Digital assets6

Agentic Laundering and Automated SmurfingRarely covered in training

In the assessment

An autonomous agent executes the layering stage without a human in the loop: fragmenting funds into micro-transactions, selecting bridge and exchange routes on live liquidity, sizing transfers to stay inside observed thresholds, and adapting when a route stops working.

What the analyst sees

Transaction sequences with machine timing and sizing characteristics, activity that reshapes itself shortly after a control is changed, and volumes of small movements that exceed what any manual operation could sustain.

Guarantee Marketplaces and Criminal Service PlatformsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Escrow-style online marketplaces broker laundering, stolen data, scam infrastructure and trafficking services between criminal counterparties, holding funds until both sides perform.

What the analyst sees

Exposure is indirect and sits at the fiat edges: payment institutions, exchanges and correspondent relationships with entities in the group's network. The prohibition itself is the compliance obligation.

Investment and Romance Scam Proceeds Infrastructure

In the assessment

Long-form investment and relationship frauds, frequently run from trafficked-labour compounds, collect victim funds through mule accounts and convert them into stablecoins for onward settlement.

What the analyst sees

Victim-side outbound payments escalating over weeks to newly added payees and exchange accounts, followed by indemnity claims and recall requests once the victim realises. The collection accounts show inbound from many unconnected individuals.

Ransomware Proceeds Conversion

In the assessment

Extortion payments received in bitcoin are converted rapidly into stablecoins or swapped through decentralised protocols, often within hours, before distribution to affiliates.

What the analyst sees

Victim-side: an urgent, unexplained payment to an exchange or a specialist incident-response intermediary. Insurer and IR-firm accounts are a concentration point.

Crypto ATMs and OTC Brokers

In the assessment

Cash is converted to crypto through machines or over-the-counter brokers who accept cash and settle on-chain, providing a placement route that bypasses bank deposit controls entirely.

What the analyst sees

ATM operator and OTC broker settlement accounts with cash deposit volumes inconsistent with a retail customer base, and customers whose card spending continues after banked income stops.

Unhosted Wallets and Fragmented Off-Ramping

In the assessment

Value is held in self-custody between hops and cashed out in many small amounts across multiple venues and individuals, so no single off-ramp sees an amount worth investigating.

What the analyst sees

Numerous customers each receiving modest, regular exchange settlements with no other economic profile, sharing device, address or beneficiary characteristics.

Trade and documents6

Services Invoicing with No Deliverable

In the assessment

Advisory, market-access and logistics consultancy invoiced in round sums with no hours, rates, deliverables or dates. Services carry no customs reference value, which is why the typology migrated from goods.

What the analyst sees

Round-figure invoices, no schedule of services, fee levels the file does not justify, and counterparties incorporated shortly before the contract date.

Mirror Transfers and Daigou PurchasingRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Professional laundering networks settle obligations by offsetting: cash is delivered to a criminal group in one country while an equivalent sum is credited in another, with no cross-border transfer. Purchasing agents buy luxury goods on cards and settle the balances with criminal cash.

What the analyst sees

Card accounts repaid in cash or by unrelated third parties, purchase volumes far exceeding personal use, and paired domestic flows in two jurisdictions with no instrument connecting them.

Capital-Flight Invoicing with Genuine Goods

In the assessment

A real export at a real price leaves surplus foreign currency offshore, which is then sold domestically at a premium against a cover purchase, moving value out of a capital-controlled currency.

What the analyst sees

Offshore receipt accounts holding balances well above production cost, cover purchases of high-value goods with no commercial logic, and settlement rates away from market.

Environmental Crime ProceedsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Illegally sourced timber, minerals, fish, wildlife, waste or oil is commingled with legitimate product early in the supply chain, after which the two are indistinguishable and the proceeds enter the financial system as ordinary commodity trade.

What the analyst sees

Commodity trade finance where volumes exceed the licensed or certified capacity of the stated source, certification and permit documentation that cannot be reconciled to the shipment, and front companies with no operational footprint at origin.

Illicit Excise Goods and Diversion

In the assessment

Tobacco, alcohol and fuel are diverted from duty-suspended movement or manufactured illicitly, and the proceeds are placed through wholesale and retail businesses that plausibly handle the same goods.

What the analyst sees

Wholesale accounts with purchase volumes inconsistent with declared duty, rapid movement of goods between connected traders, and cash takings at retail exceeding what the site can support.

Counterfeit Goods and IP Crime Proceeds

In the assessment

Counterfeit product is sold through online marketplaces and social channels, with proceeds settled through payment service providers and consolidated by aggregators before repatriation.

What the analyst sees

Merchant accounts with high chargeback and dispute rates against a narrow product range, settlement to beneficiaries unrelated to the listed merchant, and rapid rotation of storefronts under the same banking relationship.

Assets and stores of value6

Gold, Refining and Free-Trade ZonesRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Cash buys gold, gold crosses borders as scrap, jewellery or dore, and refining resets its origin. Bars are also used to move value physically, sometimes with counterfeit cores.

What the analyst sees

Bullion dealer and refiner accounts with volumes inconsistent with declared sourcing, and national export statistics exceeding any domestic mining or refining capacity.

Real Estate: engineered foreclosure and retained controlRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Property is nominally lost to a creditor while beneficial ownership never changes, or is held through a dissolved foreign entity that remains the registered owner.

What the analyst sees

Repossession followed by continued occupation or management by the former owner, debt routed through a professional intermediary, and funds flowing back to the supposedly dispossessed party.

Fabricated Rental Income and Ghost Tenants

In the assessment

A property portfolio reports rent from tenants who do not exist, giving illicit cash a documented income stream and a tax history.

What the analyst sees

Rent credits inconsistent with occupancy or utility data, tenants who never pay late, and payments originating from accounts connected to the landlord.

High-Value Portable Goods

In the assessment

Watches, vehicles, gemstones and collectables convert cash into portable value that resells readily and carries no ownership registry, moving across borders as personal property.

What the analyst sees

Dealer accounts taking third-party payments for goods delivered to someone else, part-exchange chains that never settle in cash, and customers whose purchases exceed any evidenced income.

Insurance Product MisuseRarely covered in training

In the assessment

A policy is used as a store and cleaning mechanism: a large single premium is paid, the policy is surrendered early at a deliberate loss, and the proceeds leave as an insurer payment, which downstream institutions treat as inherently clean.

What the analyst sees

Single premium payments from third parties or unrelated jurisdictions, early surrender accepted at a material penalty, frequent changes of beneficiary, and cooling-off cancellations with refunds directed to a different account from the one that paid.

Mortgage and Property Finance Fraud

In the assessment

Borrowing is obtained on fabricated income, undisclosed deposits of criminal origin, or inflated valuations, and the loan both launders the deposit and generates a legitimate ownership record.

What the analyst sees

Deposits gifted by parties with no evidenced means, income documentation that cannot be corroborated with the employer or HMRC, valuations materially above comparable sales, and early full repayment shortly after completion.

Professional and market12

Laundering and Fraud as a ServiceRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Capability is rented rather than built. Subscription platforms supply mule account provisioning, KYC-bypass tooling, synthetic identity generation, deepfake kits and end-to-end laundering, so an operator needs money rather than skill.

What the analyst sees

The same tooling signature across customers with no other connection: identical document templates, shared device or capture characteristics, and mule accounts appearing in coordinated batches rather than individually.

Engineered Litigation and Court-Ordered SettlementRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Fabricated debt is guaranteed, defaulted, sued upon in a compliant jurisdiction and settled by court order, so proceeds arrive as a judgment rather than a payment.

What the analyst sees

Large inbound settlements supported by foreign court orders. The control weakness is that court-ordered recoveries are assumed clean and rarely receive enhanced due diligence.

Legal and Accountancy Client Account Misuse

In the assessment

A regulated professional's client account is used as a banking facility, lending the transaction the firm's own reputational cover and obscuring the underlying parties.

What the analyst sees

Client account movements with no underlying legal or accountancy transaction, funds returned to source shortly after receipt, and pooled balances that cannot be reconciled to matters.

TCSPs and Professional Enablers

In the assessment

Company formation, nominee director, registered office and trustee services are supplied at scale, assembling the structures other typologies depend on.

What the analyst sees

Clusters of customers sharing a registered office, a formation agent or a nominee, incorporated in batches, and presenting near-identical onboarding documentation.

Accounts Prepared to Legitimise Falsified RecordsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Books and records are falsified to give criminal funds a documented commercial origin, and a professional accountant is then engaged to prepare financial statements from them. The resulting accounts carry the adviser's standing rather than the client's, and are what a bank, a lender or a registry subsequently relies on.

What the analyst sees

Filed accounts showing turnover a business of that size, premises or headcount could not generate; certificates of confirmation supporting figures no independent record corroborates; and a cash-intensive client whose declared takings rise without any matching change in the operation.

Insolvency as a Laundering EndpointRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Value is extracted from a company before it is wound up, and the liquidation then terminates scrutiny: the trade continues through a successor while the debts and the records stay with the entity that failed. The wind-up presents as ordinary commercial failure, which is the point.

What the analyst sees

Assets and trade transferred to a newly incorporated company with the same operation and different directors shortly before insolvency; directors with a history of successive failed companies in the same trade; and a company whose final months show payments to connected parties rather than to creditors.

Mirror and Arbitrage Trading

In the assessment

Matched opposite trades in the same securities are placed through two branches by commonly controlled entities, converting currency and moving value while appearing to be ordinary market activity.

What the analyst sees

Customers whose trades consistently lose money on fees and spreads, identical baskets bought and sold across branches, and no economic rationale beyond currency conversion.

Bribery Conduits and Consultancy Payments

In the assessment

Improper payments are routed as consultancy fees, royalties, dividends or capital gains so the receipt reads as ordinary income.

What the analyst sees

Consultancy receipts from jurisdictions where the recipient holds influence, payments unconnected to any deliverable, and timing correlated with contract awards.

Terrorist Financing: small-value and fundraisingRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Funding is raised in small amounts through appeals, crowdfunding and sham charitable structures, and moved in values individually too low to trigger monitoring. The concern is destination and intent rather than the size or origin of the funds.

What the analyst sees

Small recurring outbound payments to campaigns, appeals or virtual asset addresses associated with proscribed causes; a charity whose disbursement pattern does not match its stated programme; and clusters of small transfers converging on a single beneficiary.

Charity and Non-Profit Abuse

In the assessment

A charitable structure is created or captured to provide a legitimate-looking channel for funds, exploiting the sector's donation-based inflows and disbursement to high-risk jurisdictions.

What the analyst sees

Donation inflows inconsistent with any visible fundraising activity, grant disbursements to unverifiable overseas partners, trustee turnover with no succession, and cash withdrawals in conflict-adjacent jurisdictions.

Sport Ownership and Sponsorship

In the assessment

Clubs, sponsorship and image rights provide a channel for funds with weak valuation discipline, cross-border payments and a reputational shield that discourages scrutiny.

What the analyst sees

Club funding by shareholder loan from opaque structures, sponsorship values with no commercial benchmark, agent and image-rights payments routed through unrelated jurisdictions, and transfer fees inconsistent with market.

Loan-Back ArrangementsRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Criminal funds are placed offshore and then lent back to the launderer, so the money returns as borrowing, complete with a repayment schedule, an interest deduction and an apparently arm's-length lender.

What the analyst sees

Borrowing from an offshore entity with no lending business, security or guarantees provided by parties connected to the borrower, interest paid to a jurisdiction unrelated to the transaction, and loans that are never enforced when they fall into arrears.

Tax and revenue fraud3

MTIC and VAT Carousel Fraud

In the assessment

Goods are traded through a chain of companies across borders. A trader collects VAT and disappears before accounting for it, while the goods may circulate repeatedly through the same chain.

What the analyst sees

Rapid high-value trading between newly incorporated counterparties in the same goods, payments that pass through in hours, margins too thin to support the businesses, and directors with no trading history in the sector.

Mini-Umbrella Company FraudRarely covered in training

In the assessment

A workforce is fragmented across hundreds or thousands of small companies so each can claim employment allowances and VAT thresholds it is not entitled to, with companies replaced on a rolling basis before scrutiny arrives.

What the analyst sees

Large numbers of newly incorporated companies sharing directors, addresses or formation agents, each running modest payroll, appearing and dissolving on a cycle.

Public Funding and Support Scheme Fraud

In the assessment

Grants, loans and relief schemes are claimed by entities created or repurposed for the claim, with proceeds extracted before any repayment obligation crystallises.

What the analyst sees

Scheme proceeds received by a company with no prior trading history, immediately dispersed to directors or connected parties, followed by dissolution.

Sanctions and state actors5

Sanctions-Evasion Ownership Restructuring

In the assessment

Ownership is diluted below control thresholds or transferred to non-designated relatives and managers after designation, leaving effective control unchanged.

What the analyst sees

Ownership changes closely following a designation date, incoming owners with no commercial history, and unchanged management across the restructuring.

Shadow Fleet and Maritime Sanctions EvasionRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Ageing tankers under opaque ownership carry sanctioned cargo, disabling or falsifying position reporting and conducting ship-to-ship transfers at sea so the cargo's origin is severed from its documentation.

What the analyst sees

Trade finance and insurance exposure to vessels with dark intervals during loading, attestations that cannot be reconciled with position history, charterers and shipowners incorporated shortly before the voyage, and repeated changes of flag and name.

Dual-Use Goods Diversion

In the assessment

Controlled components are exported to an intermediary in a non-sanctioning jurisdiction and re-exported onward, with the end user misdeclared at the first hop.

What the analyst sees

Sudden growth in trade finance for electronics and machinery through transhipment jurisdictions, buyers incorporated after the export controls took effect, and end-user statements inconsistent with the buyer's business.

State-Actor Cyber Theft and LaunderingRarely covered in training

In the assessment

State-sponsored groups steal digital assets at scale from exchanges and protocols, then launder them through mixers, cross-chain bridges and complicit over-the-counter brokers to fund state programmes.

What the analyst sees

For VASPs: deposits traceable to designated addresses, and institutional counterparties who cannot evidence their own inbound provenance. For banks: correspondent exposure to intermediaries in the cash-out chain.

State-Sponsored IT Worker Payroll InfiltrationRarely covered in training

In the assessment

Operatives obtain remote technical roles using stolen or fabricated identities, often through intermediaries, and route salary payments onward to sanctioned regimes.

What the analyst sees

Payroll and contractor payments to accounts whose device and location signals contradict the stated worker location, several apparently unrelated contractors sharing payment infrastructure, and rapid onward transfer of net pay.

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