Over-escalation rate
The share of participants who escalated alerts on customers whose explanation was documented in the account notes. There is no current industry figure for this.
AML Benchmark Annual Study
We aggregate anonymised assessment results to measure what practitioners detect, what they miss, and when they escalate unnecessarily.
The share of participants who escalated alerts on customers whose explanation was documented in the account notes. There is no current industry figure for this.
How often an innocent customer was escalated by a participant who never opened that customer's file. Recorded but not penalised in the score.
Which planted findings are caught and which are consistently missed, across every case, broken down by sector, by discipline and by difficulty.
Sector-assessment performance cross-tabulated with self-declared certification, reported whichever way the data falls.
Where participants slow down and where they stop, which indicates which judgments take longest under time pressure.
Individual transcripts are read only by the review panel, and only for scoring quality review. Percentile comparisons are withheld until the participant pool is large enough for them to mean anything.
Escalating every alert in the queue scores 15 out of 100, which is below the 25 scored by a participant who dismissed the whole queue without opening a file.
Over-escalation goes largely unexamined because it does not present as an error. Nobody is criticised for filing a disclosure that turned out not to be needed. The cost falls on analyst capacity spent on customers who were never a concern, on reporting volume that makes genuine disclosures harder to act on, and on customers exited over a risk profile their bank accepted at onboarding.
We have not found a published industry benchmark for over-escalation under controlled conditions. The annual study is intended to produce one.
One documented case each week. One decision. The answer and the source afterwards.