AML Judgment Gap Report · Full findings
Payments, EMIs and Acquiring
This is a specimen. The cases, the weights, the methods and the sources are real, and are what your team would sit and what your own report would cite. The scores are invented, for a hypothetical cohort of 14 people. A real report carries your own results and nothing else.
Your team detects 12 of the 41 money laundering methods that apply to this sector. 6 need action, and 4 of those are rarely covered by standard training.
2 of these are urgent. Your team was tested on them and missed them.
Your assessment is 18 cases, not one. Each covers a different part of your exposure, and the appendix shows how many of your 41 methods each one carries. Measured against the methods that apply to this sector, not against other firms.
Since the last sitting
September cohort against March cohort. Your team detected 4 methods then and 12 now. 10 went backwards.
What to do
For each one, ask a single question. Does the team not know the method, or do they know it and have no rule that would surface it? The first needs a briefing. The second is a control gap, and it is the more serious answer.
- High
- Tested and missed, on a case covering a large part of your exposure.
- Medium
- Tested and missed on a smaller case, or never tested on one that matters.
- Low
- Never tested, and a small part of your exposure.
Ordered by priority. The reason for each is printed with it, so you can disagree with the ranking.
- 01
Agentic Laundering and Automated Smurfing
HighYour team was tested on this and missed it. It sits in The Verification Desk, which covers 9 of the 41 methods that apply to you. Training rarely covers this, so a refresher will not fix it.
- Result
- Caught 46% of the laundering customer's alerts.
- Tested by
- The Verification Desk — covers 9 of your 41 methods
- Training
- Rarely covered by standard annual refreshers
Now · BriefSend the team the register entry. It has the mechanism, the signal and the sources.
30 days · ControlWhich rule, report or alert would surface this?
Transaction sequences with machine timing and sizing characteristics, activity that reshapes itself shortly after a control is changed, and volumes of small movements that exceed what any manual operation could sustain.
90 days · Re-testSit The Verification Desk again, on the version the team has not seen.
OwnerTarget date - 02
Laundering and Fraud as a Service
HighYour team was tested on this and missed it. It sits in The Verification Desk, which covers 9 of the 41 methods that apply to you. Training rarely covers this, so a refresher will not fix it.
- Result
- Caught 46% of the laundering customer's alerts.
- Tested by
- The Verification Desk — covers 9 of your 41 methods
- Training
- Rarely covered by standard annual refreshers
Now · BriefSend the team the register entry. It has the mechanism, the signal and the sources.
30 days · ControlWhich rule, report or alert would surface this?
The same tooling signature across customers with no other connection: identical document templates, shared device or capture characteristics, and mule accounts appearing in coordinated batches rather than individually.
90 days · Re-testSit The Verification Desk again, on the version the team has not seen.
OwnerTarget date - 03
Child Sexual Exploitation Payment Patterns
MediumYour team was tested on this and missed it. Training rarely covers this, so a refresher will not fix it.
- Result
- Caught 36% of the laundering customer's alerts.
- Tested by
- The Payment Trail — covers 2 of your 41 methods
- Training
- Rarely covered by standard annual refreshers
Now · BriefSend the team the register entry. It has the mechanism, the signal and the sources.
30 days · ControlWhich rule, report or alert would surface this?
Small repeated payments, often at unusual hours, to money transfer beneficiaries in a small number of jurisdictions with no family or trade connection to the customer; use of prepaid instruments or virtual assets by a customer with no other digital activity; and payment values clustered in narrow bands.
90 days · Re-testSit The Payment Trail again, on the version the team has not seen.
OwnerTarget date - 04
Counterfeit Goods and IP Crime Proceeds
MediumYour team was tested on this and missed it.
- Result
- Caught 42% of the laundering customer's alerts.
- Tested by
- The Goods Chain — covers 2 of your 41 methods
Now · BriefSend the team the register entry. It has the mechanism, the signal and the sources.
30 days · ControlWhich rule, report or alert would surface this?
Merchant accounts with high chargeback and dispute rates against a narrow product range, settlement to beneficiaries unrelated to the listed merchant, and rapid rotation of storefronts under the same banking relationship.
90 days · Re-testSit The Goods Chain again, on the version the team has not seen.
OwnerTarget date - 05
Mirror Transfers and Daigou Purchasing
MediumYour team was tested on this and missed it. Training rarely covers this, so a refresher will not fix it.
- Result
- Caught 42% of the laundering customer's alerts.
- Tested by
- The Goods Chain — covers 2 of your 41 methods
- Training
- Rarely covered by standard annual refreshers
Now · BriefSend the team the register entry. It has the mechanism, the signal and the sources.
30 days · ControlWhich rule, report or alert would surface this?
Card accounts repaid in cash or by unrelated third parties, purchase volumes far exceeding personal use, and paired domestic flows in two jurisdictions with no instrument connecting them.
90 days · Re-testSit The Goods Chain again, on the version the team has not seen.
OwnerTarget date - 06
Crowdfunding with Controlled Investors
MediumYour team was tested on this and missed it.
- Result
- Caught 50% of the laundering customer's alerts.
- Tested by
- The Securities Book — covers 1 of your 41 methods
Now · BriefSend the team the register entry. It has the mechanism, the signal and the sources.
30 days · ControlWhich rule, report or alert would surface this?
Platform settlements to a venture with no product history, funding concentrated among connected contributors, and a rapid orderly wind-up.
90 days · Re-testSit The Securities Book again, on the version the team has not seen.
OwnerTarget date
On your own report
Each line carries your team’s result, an owner and a date. The re-test at 90 days shows what has moved.
Appendix
Evidence
Everything the finding above rests on, for anyone who wants to check it.
By case
The 18 cases that make up your assessment. Detection rate is the share of the laundering customer’s alerts the team caught. The last column counts people who escalated everything, which catches the laundering customer without deciding anything and scores badly for that reason.
| Case | Your methods | Share of assessment | Runs | Median mark | Detection rate | Escalated everything |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Verification Desk | 9 | 17% | 14 | 49 | 46% | 3 of 14 |
| The Betting Account | 7 | 13% | 14 | 87 | 83% | 3 of 14 |
| The Merchant Book | 5 | 9% | 14 | 59 | 57% | 4 of 14 |
| The Collection Network | 4 | 7% | 14 | 61 | 57% | 2 of 14 |
| The Alert Queue | 3 | 5% | 14 | 82 | 79% | 3 of 14 |
| The Client Engagement | 3 | 5% | 14 | 91 | 89% | 3 of 14 |
| The Exchange Desk | 3 | 5% | 14 | 69 | 66% | 3 of 14 |
| The Funnel Account | 3 | 5% | 14 | 78 | 76% | 2 of 14 |
| The Incoming Payment | 3 | 5% | 14 | 69 | 65% | 3 of 14 |
| The Victim Ledger | 3 | 5% | 14 | 79 | 76% | 2 of 14 |
| The Fundraising Appeal | 2 | 4% | 14 | 65 | 63% | 3 of 14 |
| The Goods Chain | 2 | 4% | 14 | 45 | 42% | 2 of 14 |
| The Payment Trail | 2 | 4% | 14 | 39 | 36% | 2 of 14 |
| The Policy Book | 2 | 4% | 14 | 87 | 83% | 3 of 14 |
| The Client Account | 1 | 2% | 14 | 80 | 77% | 3 of 14 |
| The Disclosure | 1 | 2% | 14 | 85 | — | — |
| The Securities Book | 1 | 2% | 14 | 53 | 50% | 3 of 14 |
| The Trade Corridor | 1 | 2% | 14 | 66 | 64% | 2 of 14 |
Every method
All 41 methods that apply to this sector, and where each one is documented. Full citations are at amlbenchmark.com/coverage.
| Method | Case | Rate | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agentic Laundering and Automated Smurfingrarely trainedTRM Labs, Autonomous AI Agents and Financial Crime (2026), identifying layering as the stage most susceptible to automation… | The Verification Desk | 46% | Missed |
| Child Sexual Exploitation Payment Patternsrarely trainedFinCEN Notice FIN-2021-NTC3 (16 September 2021) on identifying and reporting suspicious activity related to online child sexual… | The Payment Trail | 36% | Missed |
| Laundering and Fraud as a Servicerarely trainedFATF, Professional Money Laundering (26 July 2018), describing professional launderers, organisations and networks that launder… | The Verification Desk | 46% | Missed |
| Mirror Transfers and Daigou Purchasingrarely trainedFinCEN advisory on Chinese Money Laundering Networks (28 August 2025), identifying mirror transactions, money mules and… | The Goods Chain | 42% | Missed |
| Counterfeit Goods and IP Crime ProceedsEUIPO and OECD, Mapping Global Trade in Fakes 2025 | The Goods Chain | 42% | Missed |
| Crowdfunding with Controlled InvestorsFATF, Crowdfunding for Terrorism Financing (October 2023) | The Securities Book | 50% | Missed |
| AI-Fabricated Corporate Presencerarely trainedDue diligence industry reporting on generative AI lowering the cost of fabricating a corporate identity — website, product… | The Merchant Book | 57% | Partial |
| Chain-Hopping Across Bridges and Swapsrarely trainedElliptic, The State of Cross-Chain Crime 2025 | The Exchange Desk | 66% | Partial |
| Correspondent Banking and Nested Downstream Accessrarely trainedWolfsberg Group Principles for Correspondent Banking (2022) and the Correspondent Banking Due Diligence Questionnaire, the de… | The Trade Corridor | 64% | Partial |
| Cuckoo Smurfingrarely trainedKalimuthu v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police [2019] HCA 39 | The Funnel Account | 76% | Partial |
| Ghost Companies: struck off but still transactingrarely trainedNCA, 16 July 2025: 11,500 UK companies struck off the Companies House register following a multi-agency operation with Companies… | The Client Account | 77% | Partial |
| Guarantee Marketplaces and Criminal Service Platformsrarely trainedFinCEN finding that Cambodia-based Huione Group is a foreign financial institution of primary money laundering concern under… | The Victim Ledger | 76% | Partial |
| Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery Proceedsrarely trainedFinCEN Advisory FIN-2020-A008, Supplemental Advisory on Identifying and Reporting Human Trafficking and Related Activity (15… | The Funnel Account | 76% | Partial |
| Merchant Acquiring and Processor Abuserarely trainedWirecard AG: on 22 June 2020 the company announced that trust account balances of €1.9bn, said to be held by third-party… | The Merchant Book | 57% | Partial |
| Nested Exchange Access and Sub-Accountsrarely trainedFATF, Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and VASPs (October 2021) | The Exchange Desk | 66% | Partial |
| Stablecoin Settlement Infrastructurerarely trainedFATF, Targeted Report on Stablecoins and Unhosted Wallets (3 March 2026), attributing 84 per cent of illicit virtual asset… | The Victim Ledger | 76% | Partial |
| State-Sponsored IT Worker Payroll Infiltrationrarely trainedOFAC designations targeting DPRK IT worker facilitation, including Sim Hyon Sop of Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (April… | The Incoming Payment | 65% | Partial |
| Streaming, Licensing and Royalty Flowsrarely trainedSvenska Dagbladet investigation (2023) in which four Swedish gang members and a police investigator described converting proceeds… | The Incoming Payment | 65% | Partial |
| Synthetic and AI-Generated Onboarding Documentsrarely trainedFinCEN Alert FIN-2024-Alert004 (13 November 2024) on fraud schemes using generative AI to circumvent identity verification… | The Exchange Desk | 66% | Partial |
| Terrorist Financing: small-value and fundraisingrarely trainedFATF, Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks (July 2025) | The Fundraising Appeal | 63% | Partial |
| Virtual IBAN Misuserarely trainedFCA expectations that firms offering vIBANs hold adequate systems and controls | The Merchant Book | 57% | Partial |
| Agent and Distributor Network ExploitationFCA portfolio letter to payments firms (3 February 2025) | The Merchant Book | 57% | Partial |
| Bulk Cash Smuggling and Cash CouriersNCA press release of 28 May 2026 on a cross-border investigation across the island of Ireland: six arrests in Cookstown and the… | The Collection Network | 57% | Partial |
| Hawala and Informal Value TransferEuropol-coordinated action against a parallel-banking network, executed January 2025 and announced May 2025: 17 arrests across… | The Collection Network | 57% | Partial |
| Investment and Romance Scam Proceeds InfrastructureUS and UK joint action of 15 October 2025 against the Cambodia-based Prince Group transnational criminal organisation: OFAC… | The Victim Ledger | 76% | Partial |
| Migrant Smuggling SettlementEuropol-coordinated action executed January 2025 and announced May 2025 against a parallel-banking network laundering over €21m… | The Funnel Account | 76% | Partial |
| Mule Collection and Threshold ConsolidationNCA UK Financial Intelligence Unit, SARs in Action — Money Mules special edition (October 2023), covering mule networks as… | The Alert Queue | 79% | Partial |
| Nested Payment InstitutionsFCA portfolio letter to payments firms (3 February 2025) on financial crime controls, governance and safeguarding | The Alert Queue | 79% | Partial |
| Online Marketplaces and Controlled ResaleEuropol coordinated e-commerce fraud operations (the eCommerce Action series) and its takedowns of marketplaces trading illegally… | The Merchant Book | 57% | Partial |
| Biometric Injection and Liveness Bypassrarely trainedGroup-IB, Weaponized AI (January 2026), documenting 8,065 biometric injection attempts against the digital loan onboarding of a… | The Betting Account | 83% | Detected |
| Deepfake-Enabled Payment Instruction Fraudrarely trainedArup, Hong Kong (January 2024): 15 transfers totalling approximately HK$200m (about US$25.6m) executed in a single day after a… | The Policy Book | 83% | Detected |
| Mini-Umbrella Company Fraudrarely trainedElphysic Ltd & Ors v HMRC [2025] UKUT 236 (TCC), 17 July 2025: the Upper Tribunal upheld HMRC's VAT deregistration of… | The Client Engagement | 89% | Detected |
| Synthetic Identities at Scalerarely trainedUS Federal Reserve payments-improvement material on the transformation of synthetic identity fraud by generative AI; industry… | The Betting Account | 83% | Detected |
| Synthetic Voice Against Telephone and Callback Controlsrarely trainedFinCEN Alert FIN-2024-Alert004 (13 November 2024), whose red flags cover GenAI-assisted impersonation used to circumvent identity… | The Policy Book | 83% | Detected |
| Charity and Non-Profit AbuseFATF Recommendation 8, amended at the October 2023 Plenary to require risk-based rather than blanket measures, and the… | The Client Engagement | 89% | Detected |
| Control Probing and Detection-Threshold DiscoveryAnalytic pattern rather than a single reported case | The Betting Account | 83% | Detected |
| Gambling and Betting Channel MisuseGambling Commission, Money laundering and terrorist financing risks within the British gambling industry (2026 assessment… | The Betting Account | 83% | Detected |
| Money Mule Networks and RecruitmentFCA multi-firm review of firms' use of the National Fraud Database and mule detection tools | The Betting Account | 83% | Detected |
| NFT and In-Game Asset Wash TradingFATF and national FIU material on virtual asset market abuse | The Betting Account | 83% | Detected |
| Prepaid Cards, Gift Cards and Stored ValueHM Treasury and Home Office, National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2025 (July 2025), paragraph… | The Betting Account | 83% | Detected |
| Turnover Inconsistency Against a Physical MeasureAnalytic pattern rather than a single reported case: declared turnover tested against an independent physical measure of activity | The Client Engagement | 89% | Detected |
How this was measured
Each case is built around one customer who is laundering money. The rate is the share of that customer’s alerts the team caught.
- Detected
- Four fifths of them or more.
- Partial
- Between a half and four fifths.
- Missed
- Half or fewer.
- Untested
- No one has sat a case covering it.
Nothing is reported as detected on the strength of a good overall mark. Findings are suppressed below 3 runs on a case, because a smaller number describes one analyst rather than a team. Methods are declared on the case, not the individual alert, so this reports whether the team detected the method a case is built around rather than scoring each method separately.
